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Abstract 
Purpose 
The purpose of the paper is to suggest a strong structuration based framework for the study of 
management accounting change.  
 
Design/methodology/approach 
A retrospective field study was designed to investigate the impact of the 2008 financial crisis 
on budgeting and control practices of Greek hospitality organisations. Conduct analysis 
addresses agents’ perceptions of the changes upon themselves. Context analysis explores the 
changing context, and how the agents modified their in-situ control structures accordingly.  
The framework is demonstrated through one case study.    
 
Findings 
The agents in the case, triggered by the crisis, gradually come to criticise the way they 
practice budgeting. Their first response is to practice budgeting more normatively, but later 
they criticise and modify these norms. Variance management became pro-active rather than 
reactive. Variations in the ways agents draw upon structures – unreflectively or critically – 
and on how they act to reproduce structures – routinely or strategically – characterise change 
in management accounting practice.  Agents’ reasoning and conduct leading to action is 
local, and these local changes in conduct and context are significant in understanding 
management accounting change. 
 
Originality/Value 
This framework for studying management accounting change balances structural conditions 
of action, with action and interaction. It can be used to study how, why, and by whom 
institutionalised management accounting practices may change.  
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1. Introduction 
The framework for the study of management accounting change presented here was 
developed to analyse retrospectively the effects of the 2008 financial crisis on the budgeting 
and control structures of Greek hospitality organisations. The response of organisations to 
financial crises, as well as the implications of crises on the control structures of organisations 
is under-researched (Hopwood, 2009; Van der Stede, 2011). The importance of management 
control as a means to monitor environmental changes, as well as enable and assist 
organisational adaptation to external change is widely recognised (Emmanuel et al., 1990; 
Nixon and Burns, 2005; Otley and Berry, 1980; Otley, 2003; 2008), but there is little research 
addressing management control dynamically, i.e. how management control practice is 
adapted when the environment changes. A further motivation for the research is that research 
on management accounting tends to focus on manufacturing rather than service organisations 
(Lowry, 1990; Chenhall, 2003), leaving sectors such as the hospitality industry largely 
unexplored (Sharma, 2002).  This is despite the complexities of management control that 
service (Brignall, 1997; Modell, 1996) and hospitality (Harris and Brander Brown, 1998) 
organisations offer for analysis. 
 
From a structuration theory (ST) perspective, change is always endogenously created 
(Englund et al., 2011; Kilfoyle and Richardson, 2011), even if triggered by a contextual 
factor. Englund et al. (2011) note that the majority of ST studies provide institutional 
accounts of change, which do not reveal how knowledgeable agents draw upon and reproduce 
the structures in specific settings. They suggest placing the focus on “how and why actors 
tend to bring certain issues and events into processes of structuration” (p.508).  Englund et al. 
(2011) recognise that Giddens’ ST provides only general guidelines for the analysis of the 
reproduction or transformation of accounting practice. In comparison, the framework 
discussed here is based heavily on strong structuration theory (SST), which puts more 
emphasis on issues of research design, and on the specificities of how, why, when, and by 
whom change may come about (Coad et al., 2015; Parker, 2006).  
 
SST (Stones, 2005) is a development of structuration theory that focuses on in-situ processes 
of structuration.  That is, it emphasises how agents situated in specific settings at a specific 
time experience the process. Stones studies these processes using the Quadripartite Nature of 
Structuration (QNS) model. Structure and agency are diachronically related to each other, a 
feature that facilitates the study of how “current actions are constrained by past actions” 
(Scapens, 2006). The relationship between structure and agency has spatial and temporal 
dimensions, making a distinction between what in-situ individuals can influence through their 
agency, and what they cannot. Methodologically, Stones identifies that using Giddens’ 
guidelines produces either over-deterministic or over-voluntaristic accounts of the 
structuration process.  Giddens makes use of methodological brackets in which one either 
uses strategic conduct analysis or institutional analysis, and following this most accounting 
researchers engage in the latter. Stones offers an alternative form of bracketing which allows 
for more emphasis on epistemology rather than ontology, based on agent’s conduct and 
agent’s context analysis.  This allows for a far more nuanced account of structuration 
processes in which the agent(s)-in-focus, and their perceptions of structure, are the basis of an 
active agency that may reproduce existing structure, or produce modified or changed 
structures (Jack and Kholeif, 2008). 
 
One of the contributions of this paper is the argument that there are variations in how 
structures and in-situ agents relate to each other.  This understanding clarifies how and why 
these abstract concepts interact, and guides researchers to extract the local causalities of 
action, i.e. why in-situ agents act in certain ways and not in others. This is done by 
incorporating certain proposals from Mouzelis’ (1989) approach to structuration into the 
framework designed for this project. One reason for this is that his approach balances the 
institutional and the visual aspects of structuration.  Also, his work on the variable relations 
between structures and agents indicates how and why the conceptual elements of the QNS 
model interact in order to influence management accounting practice, addressing limitations 
of the QNS identified by Coad and Herbert (2009).  In addition, Busco et al. (2007) raise 
concerns about subject, object, and form of change, as well as time and space, in the use of 
structuration theory.  Following their work, questions of what or who makes change happen; 
who or what is changing; how and why change occurs, and to where and when it occurs, 
provide a systematic viewpoint from which to validate the framework proposed here. 
Subjects of change are considered to be distinguishable clusters of agents who may conflict 
or co-operate in the process of structuration. Objects of change are both the institutional and 
concrete dimensions of control structures. The QNS model provides direction on how 
structural reproduction or adaptation occurs: the agents draw upon both external structures 
and internal structures in order to act, and though their action the structures are reproduced or 
modified. What the agents reflect upon, and try to modify or preserve, as well as what 
simultaneously mediates their action in an unreflective way, provide in combination the 
causalities of action. 
 
There are several contributions to current debates in management accounting in this paper. 
First, a framework for the study of management accounting change is presented which offers 
an alternative to the overly-institutional trend of previous structuration research (Englund et 
al., 2011) without being overly-strategic. Second, this shows how to apply structuration 
theories in empirical accounting research, a topic that attracts limited attention in 
management accounting (Englund and Gerdin, 2014). Third, the hotel chain case that is used 
to illustrate the framework adds to the very limited empirical data on how organisations 
(especially those outside manufacturing) respond to a financial crisis (Hopwood, 2009). 
Finally, the varying degrees of the relations between structures and time-space positioned 
agents offers a way to understand how institutionalised practices and ways of thought may 
change at a local level.  
 
The paper begins with discussions of the theoretical framework, and then of methodology and 
methods. An illustrative case study follows. The agents in the case, triggered by the crisis, 
gradually come to criticise the way they practice budgeting. Their first response is to practice 
budgeting more normatively, but later they criticise and modify these norms. As their formal 
mentalities co-mediate action, variance management becomes pro-active rather than reactive. 
Variations in the ways agents draw upon structures – unreflectively or critically – and on how 
they act to reproduce structures – routinely or strategically – characterise change in 
management accounting practice.  Agents’ reasoning and conduct leading to action is local, 
and these local changes in conduct and context are significant in understanding management 
accounting change.  Different groups of agents affected structural outcomes, although to 
different extents for each group. Unexpectedly, budgeting and quality control systems took 
different directions, and it was surprising to see how formality (a structural influence 
embedded in staff dispositions from previous times) mediates courses of action. The final 
section provides discussion on how, why, and by whom management accounting change may 
occur.      
 
2. Background and theoretical framework 
How do agents adapt or change budgeting practices in response to negative environmental 
change? To address this question, changes to budgeting practice in hospitality organisations 
in Greece between 2007 and 2010 were investigated, this being a time of intense financial 
crisis in Europe. The question itself derives from broader consideration in management 
accounting and control research of the ways in which “organizations [re-]configure their 
control arrangements to enable them to adapt to, and survive in, a rapidly changing 
environment” (Otley, 2008: 236).  
 
The study of change in management accounting represents a substantial body of research into 
complex situations. There have been a number of reviews of this literature, and for Busco et 
al. (2007) the central problems relate to the subject, object, and forms of change, which are 
developed further in this paper, as well as the interplay of change and stability. Burns and 
Vaivio (2001) categorise existing research on management accounting change from three 
perspectives. The first is the epistemology of change, which includes the problems of 
epiphenomenon vs. empirical change; positive vs. negative phenomenon; the interplay of 
change and stability; and change as an ongoing process view vs. episodic change. The second 
perspective refers to the logic(s) of change. From this point of view, change may be a 
managed and formal, or an unmanaged phenomenon that also contains informal elements. 
Moreover, change can follow a functional logic, or may involve political gaming and power 
struggles. Finally, management of change may be centrally or locally driven, and 
management accounting practices could passively reflect or actively shape change. 
 
Crises offer opportunities for the study of change (Van der Stede, 2011). When a crisis occurs 
it may be reasonable to believe that budgeting and control practices will adapt to reflect the 
new conditions. However, such change is problematic. Hansen et al. (2003) argue that 
conventional budgets cannot reflect rapidly changing environments whilst Becker (2014) 
reports cases where a crisis led to abandonment of budgetary control. The effects of financial 
crises on organisational environments are often unanticipated. Institutionalised management 
accounting practices and procedures tend to be followed even when conditions change 
(Granlund, 2001), or change slowly (Scapens, 1994). If rigidly applied or inert, controls may 
even prevent the organisation from adapting to a new context (van der Steen, 2009). This 
may depend further on whether centrally managed and formal, or unmanaged and local, 
logics shape the course of action, as well as on the functional or political rationalities of 
actions (Burns and Vaivio, 2001).  
 
The problem is where to locate agency (Busco et al., 2007). A crisis represents a contextual 
change driver, to which organisational structures have to adapt (e.g. Abernethy and Chua, 
1996). However, change is always dependent on the actions of individuals (e.g. Busco et al., 
2007). Structuration theory tries to balance the structure vs. agent dichotomy. Crises change 
the conditions under which agents either reproduce structures, or do otherwise (Englund et 
al., 2011). Crises may trigger revolutionary changes in formal management accounting rules, 
or routines, or both (Burns and Scapens, 2000); create conditions of increased reflexivity 
(Seal et al., 2004); rebalance power between groups of agents, and lead to other structural 
changes. 
 
That outcomes might lead to improved systems cannot to be taken for granted though 
(Macintosh and Scapens, 1991). Actual change is uncertain as it has to overcome agents’ 
preferences for ontological security; taken-for-granted understandings of accounting 
practices; lack of knowledge of alternatives; contradictions between new and existing 
structures, and recourse asymmetries between agents attempting change and other agents 
opposing it (Englund et al., 2011). During financial decline, management accounting change 
may be resisted because people resist social change and its uncertainties (Granlund, 2001). 
Budgeting structures may counterbalance the role ambiguity associated with the changing 
conditions (Marginson and Ogden, 2005). Flexible routines may ‘protect’ formal control 
structures even when there is an apparent need for change (Lukka, 2007).  Change and 
stability need not exclude each other, but may appear in parallel in different structural 
dimensions (Burns and Scapens, 2000).    
 
SST addresses, in a balanced way, the contribution of structures and individuals on the course 
of action. Researchers may investigate local specificities of change, as part of a research 
stream focusing on the socio-political dimensions of management accounting change. One 
criticism is that this critical-interpretive accounting approach to the topic neglects the 
potential of functional and institutional logics to be recognised as part of the process of 
change (Wanderley and Cullen, 2013). SST enables functional logics to enter into the 
analysis of change processes, when addressing how economic and technical changes shift the 
horizon of action and the capabilities of agents, although it cannot be claimed that it provides 
a total balance between social-political and functional approaches to research design. The 
next section sets out a research investigation design using SST that attempts to achieve the 
balance between agency and structure lacking in many other studies of management 
accounting change.  
 
2.1. SST and the three levels of ontology  
The research design began with the model of the Quadripartite Nature of Structuration (QNS) 
(depicted in the first row of figure 1).     
 
A distinctive characteristic of SST is that it approaches structuration through the point of 
view of time-space positioned agents, what Stones (2005: 81-84) calls the intermediate zone 
of position-practices. Emphasis is placed on the action horizon as perceived by particular in-
situ agents. Therefore, it is possible to speak, for example, of external structures in relation to 
specific time-space positioned agents – the agents-in-focus of a research project – meaning 
that these structures are perceived as external by the agents-in-focus and not that they are 
external from agency (the latter being a view of structures that structuration theory rejects).  
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Figure 1. The QNS and the three abstract-concrete levels of ontology (based on Stones, 2005: 77, 85) 
 
Stones (2005: 76-81) suggests a sliding ontological scale to connect the abstract 
conceptualisations of social theory, the ontology-in-general, with the ontic level of the 
“particular concrete and/or situated entities in the world”.  The study of adaptation in 
budgeting practices and control configurations is, in essence, a study of change at an ontic-
level. QNS is at the level of ontology-in-general (Stones, 2005: 84-115). The model addresses 
how the ontological concepts connect in a diachronic sequence, a characteristic that makes it 
appealing for studies on change. In T1 (T = Time) there are the external structures, the 
conditions of action, imposing either independent or irresistible causal influences to the 
agents. In T2 there are the agents’ internal structures, referring both to the agents’ 
conjunctually-specific understanding of their structural surrounding and their general-
dispositions. Active agency follows in T3, and structural outcomes in T4. The abstract 
ontological concepts provide both a guide and a contextualising frame for in-situ studies. 
However, the concepts provide limited frame unless translated to ontic/in-situ categories 
(p.83). The framework suggested in this paper attempts this translation.  
 
Between the abstract and the ontic Stones inserts a meso-level of theorisation. The meso-level 
aims in making “possible to talk about at least some abstract ontological concepts in terms of 
scales or relative degrees.”  For example, it is possible to address more or less structural 
intractability, knowledge, reflection, capabilities and so on in “the ontic manifestations of 
general ontological concepts without losing sight of the logical relationships between the two 
levels of analysis” Stones (2005: 78). At this meso-level, a researcher can address how and 
why the abstract concepts of the QNS model interact in order to influence practice. The next 
subsection discusses SST concepts in more detail. The analytical categories of the object(s), 
subject(s) and forms of change are used in order to address the perspective on change that 
SST offers.   
 
2.2. Objects, subjects and forms of change 
Stones approaches the more concrete aspects of structuration through the conceptualisation of 
external structures (Coad and Glyptis, 2014). External structures “involve position-practices 
and their networked relations” (Stones, 2005: 109). Social positions contain structuring 
properties related to the identity of the position, perceptions of the obligations and 
prerogatives that each position carries, and the way the position is interrelated with a range of 
other positions in context. Practice is the enactment of these expectations through the actions 
of position-incumbents. (Coad and Glyptis, 2014). Structures provide the horizon of action to 
the agents. The structures not only provide constraints, but also a range of possibilities open 
to the agents-in-focus. Taking a meso-level perspective, external structures provide degrees 
of constraint, as well as degrees of enablement, to the projects and priorities of the agents-in-
focus (Stones, 2005: 122-126). These structures may impose independent causal influences, 
when they enjoy autonomy from the agent-in-focus. Independent structures mediate, that is 
constrain and enable, action, but their reproduction is irrelevant from the agent(s)-in-focus. In 
contrast, structures impose irresistible causal influences, when they are related to the agent-
in-focus, but the latter feel that s/he cannot resist them (Stones, 2005, 109-115). Structures in 
the external environment may be either independent or irresistible for the organisational 
agents. Organisational control structures may be conceived as in-situ external structures 
(Stones, 2005: 114) that impose more or less irresistible causal influences to the in-situ 
agents. Position-practices of other organisational agents impose limits on the horizon of 
action of any agent-in-focus. Even so, the agent-in-focus is part of that network of position-
practices, therefore s/he has some degree of influence on the control structures[1], that is, in-
situ structures are potentially able to be modified by her/him (Stones, 2005: 66). This point is 
discussed further at the end of this section.  
 
However, the accounting literature suggests that institutionalised, and taken for granted 
mentalities and practices of control have a strong influence on how organisations respond to 
environmental change (Burns and Scapens, 2000) and may even prevent the organisation 
from adapting to change (Granlund, 2001; van der Steen, 2009). Moreover, Coad and Herbert 
(2009) suggest that insights from institutional theory could provide a clearer link on how and 
why the conceptual elements of the QNS model interact. Therefore, in the framework the in-
situ control and budgeting structures are analytically divided into a visible-relational and a 
virtual- institutional dimension. The former points towards actual and the latter towards 
normative relations. Institutional structures, as a virtual system of norms and roles, entail a 
set of rights and obligations inherent in given social positions, while figurational structures 
are an actual system of relationships between actors (Mouzelis, 2008: 228).  
 
Normative structures are “wholes of interrelated roles (which entail normative expectations) 
or institutions (entailing a cluster of interrelated roles)”, while figurational structures involve 
“actual relations [and interactions] between actors unfolding syntagmatically [i.e. actually] in 
time and space” (Mouzelis, 2000: 743-744). The former suggests interrelations between 
positions engaged with budgeting (for example) in an organisation, and the budgeting 
practice normatively associated with each position. The latter addresses the actual relations 
between position-incumbents in the course of budgeting interaction. While the normative 
dimension entails relations between positions and roles, suggesting issues of incompatibilities 
or compatibilities between positions or institutional complexes, the figurational dimension 
entails relations between actors and points towards problems of conflict or co-operation 
(Mouzelis, 2008: 83). As mentioned above, the conceptualisation of position-practices 
encompasses both normative expectations and concrete practices and relations. However, 
there are advantages in addressing them as distinct. First, how a number of positions are 
expected to relate to one another may, within limits, be different from the actual relations 
between the specific actors that occupy these positions; consequently the figurational 
dimension can vary and change independently from the institutional one (p.196). Second, in 
the course of interaction actors may fulfil wholly, partially, or not at all the normative 
expectations of their positions. Figurational structures may entail then “different degrees of 
normativity” (p.110). Finally, the agents may follow different orientations towards these two 
dimensions of structure. Again, this point is discussed further later in this section.   
 
Budgeting and control practice may be routine, or strategic. The first refers to agents just 
acting or reacting without paying any conscious attention to the reasons or consequences of 
their doings. The second refers to cases that an agent acts consciously or/and strategically 
(Stones, 2005: 100-101).  In both cases practice follows the agent’s interpretation of the 
external.  Adaptive budgeting practice reproduces the budgeting and control structures, and 
may result in structural stability or change. In SST practice always follows the agents’ 
hermeneutics and understanding of their structural terrain.  
 
Who or what makes change happen are the subjects of change. From a ST perspective 
possible sources of change are (1) changes in the conditions governing the system 
reproduction, like financial crises, (2) reflexivity, (3) structural contradictions, (4) unintended 
change as part of daily practice, and (5) disembedding / re-embedding mechanisms (Englund 
et al., 2011). However, a useful distinction is between what or who triggers change 
(Hopwood, 1987) and who makes change happen. From a SST point of view, change is 
dependent on the subjectivity of the agent, i.e. it is endogenous. Many things outside an 
agent-in-focus can trigger and motivate change in her/his actions, or even shift her/his 
horizon of action. Nevertheless, it is through the action of organisational agents that the 
control structures are reproduced or modified, and agents draw upon their internal structures 
in order to act and interact.  
 
Internal structures refer both to the agents’ conjuncturally-specific understanding of their 
structural surrounding and their dispositions. The first covers the understanding of the agent-
in-focus of (a) how other agents in context are likely to interpret the actions of others 
(signification), (b) what power capacities they consider they have (domination), and (c) the 
normative actions they are likely to adopt (legitimation). Dispositions cover deep structures 
within agents (Giddens, 1984), which are shared among those agents who have gone through 
similar socialisation processes (Mouzelis, 2008: 193). They include the internalised world 
views, cultural schemas, classifications, typifications of things, people and networks, and so 
on (Stones, 2005: 88). Dispositions, acting as an internal frame of reference for the agents, 
co-mediate their reading of a situation and the norms surrounding the situation. The term co-
mediate is used to highlight that action is mediated – constrained and enabled – 
simultaneously by a plurality of structures or structural dimensions.  However, arguing that 
control structures depend on the actions of organisational agents for their reproduction or 
change is rather a tautology from a structuration point of view. What is really of interest is 
which agents bring about change. This is covered next along with issues on why and how 
they introduce change.  
 
The forms of change address why and how change happens. Coad and Herbert (2009) argue 
that the QNS model is silent on why its conceptual constructs interact to affect management 
accounting practice. It is suggested in this paper that the link to the above is to address the 
variations to the connections between the abstract ontological concepts of the QNS, i.e. to 
engage with the meso-level of theorisation and the variability on agents and agency. 
Variability addresses the varying degrees of capability that different clusters of agents-in-
focus/subjects of change have. Moreover, variability covers the varying degrees of distancing 
between an agent-in-focus and the structures that mediate her/his actions, as well as the 
varying degrees of action outcomes in regards to the intentional vs. unintentional continuum. 
 
In the course of action and interaction the agent-in-focus draws on his/her structures either 
unreflectively or critically (Stones, 2005: 55-58). In the first case the agent-in-focus in a 
habitual and unreflective way reproduces the structures. In the second case there is a critical 
distancing from the structures. Critical distancing addresses “...cases where rules and 
resources (in language, kinship, political or economic institutions) operate not so much as 
resources but as topics, not so much as means for acting, but as strategic goals, as objects that 
the subject approaches with theoretical, critical or monitoring intent” (Mouzelis, 2008: 117 – 
original emphasis).The already discussed distinction between routine and strategic action is 
based here. Routine action follows unreflective attitudes. Cases where the agent(s) 
strategically monitor structures (consciously try to change or preserve them) follow more 
critical orientations. Nevertheless, it is not possible to get completely away from the flow of 
action. The agent draws upon a plurality of structures in order to act (Coad and Hebert, 2009; 
Kilfoyle and Richardson, 2011; Mouzelis, 2008). Every distancing is always partial and 
incomplete since the agents need to draw upon other structures – that way reproducing them 
– in order to reflect upon any structural characteristic of their environment of action 
(Giddens, 1993: 6; Stones, 2005: 58). However, this partial distancing provides the local 
reasoning of action, i.e. why situated agents act in certain ways and not others. Moreover, it 
sensitises to the diverse and plural outcomes of action. That is because even when agents act 
strategically, they unreflectively draw upon and reproduce other structures.   
 
Agency in structuration theory is connected with power: the ability of agents to act and 
influence their environment of action and interaction. On the one hand, certain structural 
formations may be intractable from the point of view of any agent-in-focus. On the other 
hand, other structures may well be modifiable or malleable when the agent-in-focus has the 
ability to have an impact on them (Stones, 2005: 66-67). Organisational control structures are 
potentially modifiable by the organisational agents. However, agents occupying different 
positions in an organisation have differing abilities to influence the reproduction of the 
control structures (Mouzelis, 1989; 2008: 227).   
 
Both the above provide a shift from the potential to the actual change agents. The unreflective 
– reflective continuum suggests varying degrees of critical distancing (Mouzelis, 2008: 115-
119, 124-130), and directs to the agents that have interests in preserving or changing the 
control structures or aspects of them. Power variations point towards those that have the 
capabilities to bring about or influence change (Mouzelis, 2008: 226-228). Variability also 
addresses the intentional change/unintentional reproduction mix that strategic action may 
bring about.       
 
The meso-level variations discussed above have implications on issues of research design and 
data analysis. These are discussed next. The potential of the framework in studying the local 
specificities of change is illustrated through the case study that follows.  
 
3. Methodology 
The design of the research undertaken in this project is a circular design (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997: 83–86): theory is used to direct the exploration, and the empirical data gathered are 
used to refine the theory. Since the phenomenon under study had already occurred (making 
the study retrospective), the aim was to collect narrative data on how hospitality organisations 
had responded to the crisis (Czarniawska, 2014: 21-27). Although the crisis had an impact on 
the whole Greek hospitality industry, there were accessibility problems. A similar difficulty 
in getting access to organisations facing financial problems was reported by Collier and 
Gregory (1995) in their study of the UK hospitality industry.       
 
Despite this, workable data was obtained from 4 organisations. In these four cases 27 
interviews from 25 participants took place. In the illustrative case used here, data were 
gathered between July 2011 and March 2012. This was the last of the 4 organisations visited. 
A total of 9 interviews took place ranging between 40 minutes and 1 hour. All of the 
interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. The researcher was also given access to a 
number of documents, mainly covering data regarding the history, the philosophy, the 
policies, and the quality control procedures of the organisation. Moreover there were plenty 
of publicly available data covering the period 2008 – 2011. The president and CEO of the 
organisation held a leading position in an associative body during this period and as such his 
views were frequently published in the press. Although he spoke on behalf of the association 
and not the organisation, a number of his positions are likely to be applicable to the 
organisation too (for instance he had publicly stated from 2008 that the crisis will be 
persisting). Another two press releases and four TV interviews by organisational 
representatives were also used. The above data, press, and TV interviews cover a four year 
period of crisis. The importance of these data lies in the fact that they express the positions of 
organisational members at a specific point of time, mainly, but not exclusively, regarding the 
changing economic environment. As such, they complement and triangulate the retrospective 
reporting of the interviewees for this research.   
 
While previous research uses the QNS model to analyse already collected data, this project 
uses the model to design the research rather than just in post-hoc analysis. Whilst the former 
approach can be valid, Blaikie (2010), Layder (1998), and others prefer empirical research 
that has at least theory in mind. One of the recognised strengths of Stones’ work is the way in 
which it operationalises structuration theory in terms of both design and analysis (Bryant and 
Jary, 2011; Coad et al., 2015).  Rather than the QNS model Stones (2005: 120-123) makes 
the bracketing of agent(s)’ conduct and context analysis central to the research design using 
ST. The meeting point of the two brackets is the subjectivity of the agent(s)-in-focus, i.e. 
conjuncturally-specific internal structures link the brackets. In the case of conduct analysis 
they are directed inwards, towards the dispositions and practices of the agent-in-focus. In the 
case of context analysis they are directed outwards to the structural terrain the agent-in-focus 
faces. Conduct analysis concentrates “upon how actors reflexively monitor what they do; 
how they draw upon rules and resources in the constitution of interaction” (Giddens, 1984: 
378). Within this bracket, a researcher can try to identify (1) the general-dispositional frames 
of an agent-in-focus, and (2) how an agent-in-focus perceives that her/his intermediate 
structural terrain – the possibilities allowed and the constrains imposed upon her/him –
impacts upon her/his own projects, whether in terms of empowerment or not, or in change on 
priorities. The focus in this research is on how the agents-in-focus, by reflecting upon the 
changes in context, perceive that these changes impact upon their projects, and the possible 
impact on their dispositions/knowledge.  
 
Context analysis tries to capture (1) relevant external clusters of agents and the position-
practices relations that constitute them. Keeping in mind that external structures are 
diachronically distinct as means and conditions (T1), as well as outcomes (T4) of, action, 
within context analysis (2) the influence of particular clusters of agents on structural 
reproduction can be identified. This includes a factual analysis on what happened and by 
whom, and a hermeneutic analysis on the causalities of action (Stones, 1991). Here, context 
analysis is used to explore the changes in context, as well as how the agents-in-focus, in turn, 
orientated themselves towards the in-situ control structures, i.e. from what aspects of the 
control structures they took distance, and from what they did not, what they routinely 
reproduced and what they strategically tried to change or preserve. The meso-level concepts 
discussed in the previous section are used in both analyses; variations are used to address the 
local causalities of action, the capabilities of distinct clusters of agents to influence structural 
reproduction, and the intentional-unintentional impact of action on structures.  
 
The model, as initially formatted, provided the themes of the inquiry. As such, it was possible 
to ask direct and penetrating questions on these themes. That made possible the production of 
sufficiently rich data on the themes under enquiry. Of particular value were questions aiming 
to provide narrative and evaluative data (Wengraf, 2001: 111–151, 174). Template analysis 
(King, 2004) was used to synthesise the themes deriving from theory (Miles and Huberman, 
1994: 58; Wengraf, 2001: 255–283) with the themes emerging from the data (Ahrens and 
Dent, 1998; Miles and Huberman, 1994: 61–62). The dialog between theory and empirical 
data was used to refine the framework (Lukka and Modell, 2010). The initial level of analysis 
was the interviewee. All other organisational agents were considered as being external for the 
agent-in-focus. By triangulating the way the interviewees interpreted the actions of 
themselves and the others, the analysis moved from the agent-in-focus to relatively distinct 
clusters of agents-in-focus. The next phase was to analyse who did what, why, and to what 
extent these clusters influenced the adaptation of control practice.  
 
The framework as discussed above includes most of the data-emerging refinements. 
However, the analytical distinction between normative and figurational control structures, as 
well as the distinction of practice to routine and strategic emerged during the analysis of the 
case study. Finally, despite the already implemented suggestions on addressing a plurality of 
structures (or perhaps because of) a strong interplay between the budgeting and the quality 
control structures of the organisations was recognised. These issues are addressed in the 
discussion section.      
  
 
4. Empirical application 
4.1 The organisation 
The organisation was founded in the mid-1980s as a single hotel. A second hotel was 
constructed four years later. By the early 2000s the organisation had developed into a hotel 
chain of ten hotels and a number of conference centres, with a number of smaller projects 
also being completed. All the hotels are owned and managed by the organisation. At the time 
of writing, they had more than 5,000 available beds, over 1,500 staff, and a new hotel under 
construction. The hotels vary from a minimum rating of 4 stars up to the luxury category, and 
target mainly international tourists.  
 
Continuous improvement and innovation in new products and markets, investments in luxury 
infrastructures, and quality enhancement is the central philosophy of the organisation. Human 
resources are recognised as strategically important, and their personnel receive many 
benefits, such as long-term training and even a library covering management and operational 
titles. However, the organisation operates with a high degree of formality. For instance, they 
were one of the first hotel organisations in Greece to develop and record their quality 
standards in the early 1990s; a sizable volume describing the way in which procedures are to 
be followed and reported. Formal reports of their meetings are uploaded onto their intranet. 
In describing the organisation, the HRD[2] stated: 
 
“...I cannot say that there is something informal. 
- Isn’t it?  
- No, everything is very structured”  
 
[the abbreviations correspond to the positions of the informants – see note 2]  
 
This culture of formality in the dispositions of the agents-in-focus was central to events 
during the crisis years.  
 4.2 Budgets and budgeting 
Budgeting starts in October. After a series of smaller meetings, a final formal meeting takes 
place where the president announces the main directions and assumptions for the next year. 
By then, the marketing department has already established their first forecasts of the next 
year’s occupancies and prices per market segment or per travel agent. These expectations are 
later refined and unified at the level of each individual hotel forming the basis of its revenue 
calculations. Soon after, the hotel and departmental directors submit their project plans for 
the season. They “...say an idea, which as an idea must be supported, that is, we must do a 
small budget for the idea” (FD). These plans are accepted, rejected or revised by senior 
management and, based on that, the hotels and departments start to work on their annual 
budgets. During November the finance department sends budget forms to the hotels and 
departments. These forms include standard costs that are allocated to the hotels or supportive 
centres. Next, they agree the organisational chart for the year and make sure that it is 
reflected in the budget. All these procedures are a team effort. Hotel directors develop and 
organise tasks in close consultation with the main supervisors, as well as the finance and 
payroll departments.  
 
Hotel budgets are submitted by early December and finalised, given senior management 
agreement, by late December. Nevertheless, the hotels are resorts and the operational year 
starts sometime in spring, depending on market conditions. Between late February and early 
March the budgets are updated[3], when there “...is a correction of the first budget, in order to 
place... with more clarity and accuracy the budget data” (HD D). In periods of instability or 
unforeseen events, more updates may take place.  
 
Formally, the organisation produces annual budgets with details relating to each month. At an 
operational level, any department that is a revenue generator is characterised as a revenue 
centre and the rest as cost centres. Costs are monitored as flexible or standard, and treated 
accordingly. Operational revenue and costs end up at the gross operational profit (GOP) for 
each hotel. Next, common costs such as the costs of the hotel chain or other administrative, 
marketing, and maintenance costs are allocated to each hotel in order to calculate what they 
call GOP 2. Finally, they add depreciation and interest to produce their ‘bottom line’ profit. 
Hotel budgets are consolidated first into three divisional budgets, and then into the chain’s 
master budget.  
 
The chain uses budgets for planning and cost control. A control mechanism is in place to 
ensure excessive variances in important cost items do not occur. For example, staff planning 
takes place just before the start of the month. Planning reports go before the control 
department and any variances from the budgeted figures have to be justified. Moreover, the 
actual working days of line-staff are closely monitored by the controllers who take 
appropriate action where needed. Managers have open access to all budgets and budget data. 
During the operational period there are weekly meetings in each hotel, where the budget is 
always a discussion point. Once a month, a formal meeting takes place between the hotels 
and central administration. One of the issues is the course that the budget is taking. In cases 
of important changes, the budget has to be revised.  
 
4.3 Reflecting external change, understanding change  
The organisation operates mainly in three geographical areas and its hierarchical structuring 
reflects these areas as operational divisions. Local events greatly affected one division’s 
occupancies as early as August 2007, then again in 2008. For the most fortunate division, the 
crisis depressed occupancies in 2008, but numbers were more satisfactory from 2009 
onwards. Their main division, in size equal to both other divisions put together, had a good 
year in 2008, but was heavily affected during 2009. 2010 was slightly better, but still a bad 
year, and 2011 was considered as fair. In general, the crisis affected the hotels at different 
times, depending on their location. Overall, the managers consider that the crisis started to 
affect them in 2008, creating a trough in 2009, which later diminished. Nevertheless, 
occupancies are only one part of the story. 
 
They managed to deal with decreased occupancies in the long run through targeted marketing 
strategies, such as organising tours for travellers with niche interests (i.e., with interventions 
at the meso-level of their external environment). They organised events in targeted towns 
within Europe, where they could gather and interact with selected representatives from 
important travel agents and tour operators. Nevertheless, there were other changes that they 
were unable to influence. Their main concern was the worsening cash flow. Travel agencies 
were, by 2008, holding back cash payments. Banking institutions were unable or unwilling to 
support the industry’s operations. The majority of their hotels are summer resorts needing 
financial support during the non-operational season. Not only were the banks now less 
willing to provide new cash flow lines, but due to rising interest rates, taking out new loans 
did not appeal and older ones became more expensive. Moreover, when the financial crisis 
started the organisation was heavily committed in terms of investments, such as the 
construction of a new hotel.  
 
A distinctive characteristic of the organisational environment during that period, though, was 
the high rate of unpredictable and intense political and economic interventions. These 
affected hotels both directly and indirectly; directly, by heavily increased taxation and 
indirectly by shaping aspects of the markets in which they operate. As a result, budgeted 
costs were also under pressure. The following reflection by a hotel director (HD C) is 
indicative on how these changes in context are perceived to impact both the organisation and 
his conduct.  
 
“...while budgeting now for 2012, because the figures now don’t run as we want them, 
as they used to be... if in 2008 we had a turnover of let’s say ten million, but what did 
we have then? We had a V.A.T. of 18%, we had other interests and other taxes in 
general... some side taxes that have increased very much... they have given me added 
expenses of one million out of nothing... which company has such a profitability that 
can hold a 10% increase of expenses out of nothing?” 
 
4.4 Adapting to change  
At the peak of the crisis the organisation was committed to major investments, and one of its 
divisions was already under pressure due to low occupancy rates dating back to 2007. Despite 
the fact that the financial crisis had not seriously affected them in 2008, their senior 
management forecasted, at that time, that the crisis would be a lasting one and took some 
forward-looking actions. This pro-activity at the strategic level could be seen in their day-to-
day operations as the crisis persisted. Reflecting that the changes in the context of the 
organisation would put even more pressure on the cash flow, senior management sifted the 
priorities of their projects and directed the organisation towards self-sustainability rather than 
growth. New investment would be minimal, although the hotel under construction was 
continued, but at a slower pace. 
 
Executive and managerial remunerations were reduced in an effort to preserve management 
posts. Resources available to directors and supervisors were also reduced. Line staff had no 
reductions in their salaries, but they found themselves with more days off to match 
occupancy rates and gradually less seasonal posts were available. However, all staff had to be 
more productive, to protect the organisation’s reputation for quality and luxury.  
 
When this policy was introduced in 2008, a number of executives and workers disagreed with 
the new requirements. Senior management invested a significant amount of their time in 
communicating the necessity for these actions. Nevertheless, the negative forecasts were 
shown to be fair as the crisis worsened and reactions were gradually overcome by events. 
Senior management had forecasted that the crisis would be a lasting one, but they did not 
seem to have anticipated the severe pressure on budgeted costs. Whilst they witnessed a 
positive change in their revenue during 2011, bottom line results did not improve. A second 
series of more radical changes were introduced in 2011 and 2012, affecting both positions 
and procedures within the organisation.  
 
4.4.1. Reflecting upon in-situ structures, operational action  
Although certain actions had been taken by 2008 and many cost items were examined from a 
zero base, senior management found the organisation far from their initial budgeted figures in 
2009. They had forecast that “...2010 will not be an easy year, but [they were] prepared to 
keep our quality standards and innovation” (HD A, Media Report, 2009).  
 
A large brainstorming campaign took place to collect from their personnel ideas for more 
effective and less costly operations management. Marketing expenses were significantly 
reduced and marketing actions re-orientated to meet new strategic objectives. The strategy 
was “...very simple but also very complicated at the same time. One has to watch one’s own 
habits...” (SE, Media report, 2010). Given that available resources were reducing, the goal of 
the campaign was to motivate the personnel to take critical distance from their established 
ways of doing things in order to save resources. The interviewee reports claim that this 
campaign was successful, with one example being a 22% decrease in electricity costs.  As the 
financial director confirmed, although the pressure in 2010 continued, their performance was 
slightly better because they managed to control their operations more effectively:   
 
“...we were at about the same levels of performance and at the operational level we 
were slightly better... operational costs were better in 2010... because in 2010 we had 
the experience of a negative 2009 and we made better predictions in issues regarding 
the allocation of staff, the working hours, the consumptions.”  
 
Unfortunately environmental pressure continued, so the organisation entered a second phase 
of adaptations. They wanted to remain a profitable organisation, even if only marginally: “...if 
a company is not sustainable, if it is not profitable, you cannot invest, you cannot borrow” 
(HD D). Having already completed the first phase of adaptations, which resulted in 
significant cost savings, the task at hand now was not an easy one. The savings should affect 
levels of quality as little as possible, which they recognised as vital for their long term 
sustainability:  
 
“The problem however is not to get a result in 2012, it is to get a result in 2012 and 
making sure that you will come out better in 2013, because we are service providers... 
you cannot, say, have some good contracts in 2012 and based on that to do the cuts 
and lose everything in 2013” (HD B). 
 
Pressed by the changes in organisational context, and the need to remain profitable and retain 
their levels of quality, significant changes started to take place:  
 
“Mr [president] is always proactive. So in 2008, end of 2007, when others did not 
understand what was going on, we were already proactive and we had started taking 
some actions but it was going more smoothly. But last year [2011] and this year we 
take more hardcore decisions... the first thing we did is that we examined all expenses 
from a zero base... we did not try just to reduce them, but to differentiate them, to 
change them completely... We changed some working positions, abolished others, 
gave other responsibilities... so we did an internal reorganising in a lot of positions” 
(HD A). 
 
However, re-structuring would be a more accurate term. Senior management took critical 
distance from certain procedures - which can be interpreted as local reasoning of action. The 
strategic action that followed aimed to modify these procedures: “We changed many 
procedures that were done in certain ways; we changed and simplified them in order to have 
less bureaucracy and more immediacy” (HD A); “...those procedures to be followed, they 
needed people. So we abandoned the procedures and reduced positions” (EHsk). These 
abandonments included very detailed procedures requiring line staff to spend a significant 
amount of time recording and reporting for the purposes of quality control. Since that “... 
needed a lot of workload, this ended" (HRD). Inventory control was also significantly 
reduced. For many items there had been on-line inventory control, but “...this is not 
happening any more, there is not such a cost control; the result is now monthly, not daily or 
weekly as it was before” (HRD). 
 
“...the detailed control that was taking place before in certain issues will not continue 
in the future, we were very analytical...We no longer have this luxury, and it was 
probably a foolish thing to do anyway” (HD A).  
 
They acknowledge that: 
 “...there will be some losses that way... but you say ‘I save some thousands of Euros 
in payroll, I save in future cost... but you will lose something else’... [Nevertheless] 
these are strategic choices, we reduced many procedures... because you cannot have a 
given number of people, to ask for better productivity, and ask them to become more 
bureaucratic too, you cannot do everything” [HRD]. 
 
This understanding came from an executive who had developed these procedures previously. 
She shared with the interviewer her fear about the possible unintended outcomes of this 
choice on quality performance, and her belief that when conditions allowed, they should 
return to their former standards of monitoring quality. However, she acknowledged that the 
changing context offers her limited capability to go achieve this return to previous procedures 
in the near future. Neither quality nor inventory control were regarded as unimportant. 
However, they reflected upon those activities which had become habitual and actively sought 
out routines in their control structures that required excessive resources in a crisis period. 
Interestingly, they distanced themselves from certain dispositions (Stones, 2005: 88) and de-
formalised many control procedures to secure operational working hours that could be used 
to maintain standards of service for customers with a reduced staff.  
 
The changes challenged their quality standards, but their customers were also more price 
sensitive than before and, as such, ready to accept small changes. Nevertheless, they tried to 
keep the “observed quality standard” (HD B) and be fair to their customers: 
 
“...in order to be honest and fair to the customer you may have to change operational 
philosophy. You cannot say ‘I offer lunch in five outlets’ and give the customer beans 
and a slice of bread... if you respect your customer and your work you cannot do that, 
so if you necessarily have to save something it is better to say ‘look, there are four 
outlets in which I offer lunch’ and keep your dignity in service provision” (HD B).  
 
In short, where the organisation previously implemented high degrees of bureaucracy and 
formality, it loosened these in some respects in adapting to the changing environment. This 
was reflected in the changes introduced to their operational philosophy, as well as their 
quality and inventory control procedures. The interventions to their in-situ structures resulted 
in a reduction of positions, as well as to the abandonment of certain norms associated with 
quality and inventory control. However, the budgeting part of the story is quite different.  
 
 
4.4.2. Reflecting upon budgeting, practising budgeting  
4.4.2.1 First act 
Budgeting practice was affected by the degree of change within the organisation. Managers 
soon witnessed that:  
 
“...the market is too price sensitive and contingent with last minutes offers, a situation 
that year after year gets worse, that is we get the reservation more and more on a last 
minute basis...this creates a feeling of insecurity... planning is now much more 
difficult” (HD A, Media Report, 2010).  
 
“Some years ago we could do a budget once and say ‘ok, that’s it’, we had some 
indications... we considered the trends and the situation was over. You were 
budgeting and at the most you had to update it once... during the last years we witness 
that things get more liquid, not only from last minute booking, but also from parts that 
have to do with cost calculation” (HD A). 
 
Despite this difficulty, budgeting was not loosened, and the importance of budgetary control 
was not questioned. What changed was that “…due to the facts there must be two or even 
three updates, different, say, budget versions when the external or internal conditions change” 
(HD A). The organisation needed up-to-date realistic data in order to plan how they would 
adapt to changing conditions. Predicting the volume of revenue, as well as actually bringing it 
in, was vital, because after the period budgeted for had begun “...you cannot adjust 
proportionally the costs in case of failure, you will ‘break’ the hotel” (HD B). 
 
Moreover, environmental change triggered senior management to apply both “...much more 
stringent criteria” (HD B), and “...a big pressure towards reducing all forms of expenditure in 
the budget” (HD D). Another feature that gradually lessened was the possibility of political 
‘gaming’ for resource allocations. Before “...you could say ‘how am I to do a more accurate 
evaluation in order to pick from the owners a little more... when everything [costs] has gone 
up by 10% any possibility of such claims is erased, it is erased, it is taken off the map” (HD 
B).  
 
During the operational year of the budget, there was increased pressure to stay as close to the 
budgeted figures as possible: budget pressure before “...was always there but we were not so 
much chained to the budget... you could get a little away... now there is no such thing” 
(EHsk). The above changes refer rather to actor-actor relations, and to more stringent 
enforcement of existing norms. Up to that point the only intervention targeting norms 
followed their cash flow concern mentioned above: “[E]ven [expenditure] time was given a 
specific set, say, you can only buy consumables in March and then in July... Before you could 
buy whatever you wanted every month” (HRD). 
 
At the hotel level, in order to adjust to the new conditions, as well as to the increasing 
pressures put upon them by senior management, they had to “...do much more analyses in 
order to have the desired result, if we can... The depth of analysis has gone further after the 
crisis, it is greater” (FD). Following the budget during the year required a greater workload. 
Operational managers “...have to monitor it more closely” (HD A), while in the “...finance 
department... [they] have to work much more, in order to justify some things, as well as to 
predict, to revise” (FD). They are now in “...greater readiness...it needs a lot of attention...and 
also faster decisions” (FD). Moreover, there is now increased involvement around the budget, 
not limited to those who ‘traditionally’ undertake budgeting, but expanded to lower 
hierarchical levels: “...before, the budget was the concern of the directors... not everyone was 
in the game, now they are... it has gone very deep down” (EHsk).  
 As mentioned above, the modifications introduced came from two distinct clusters of agents. 
The senior management of the hotel chain head offices in Athens, and the hotel directors and 
their teams. The changes introduced by senior management mostly targeted the actor-actor 
figurational dimension pressing for more consistency with existing norms and practice. Up to 
this moment norms were not challenged, but rather drawn upon in order to monitor actual 
practice. In other words, strategic action that aimed to modify the figurational, now routinely 
reproduced the normative dimension.  The exception to this is the precise setting of 
expenditure time limits, which were introduced to address cash-flow problems.  
 
However, these interventions triggered what was for senior management an unintended 
outcome. As the hotel directors gradually realised that the changes were shifting the horizon 
of action of their conduct, and that through budgeting they were held more accountable than 
before, they made staff in lower hierarchical positions more subject to budgetary control. 
Before the crisis those lower-level positions were not expected to interrelate with other 
positions in the organisation through budgets. But this intervention modified both the 
figurational and the normative (position-position) relations and interactions, by adding 
budgeting practice as a normative obligation to positions that were not involved in budgeting 
previously.     
 
4.4.2.2 Second act  
However, the adaptive budgeting practices did not prove sufficient to lead the organisation 
out of the ongoing crisis. As discussed above, a second phase of more radical adaptations 
started to take place during 2011 in order to respond to persisting pressure from the 
environment. At the same time, a number of changes were introduced to budgeting that were 
to change its character markedly. Yet, while other means of control became less bureaucratic, 
budgeting became more so.  
 
One director said “...after 2008 there were one to two years that we had negative results... in 
many of our hotels... but this cannot go on, so in this entire frame ways should be found in 
order, at the end of the year, for the figures to be different” (HD C). The senior management 
started to demand positive results and certain directives were issued towards this direction. 
The results were not expected to be overambitious, an illusion given the circumstances, but 
nevertheless they should have been positive, specifically positive:  
 
“...it is now very intense that we should have a comprehensive, a better, an overall 
picture of the situation and target to bring in numbers, that is, the number must come 
out... we must now focus clearly on the result” (HD A).  
 
While budgets were previously used to quantify the organisation’s plans, they pointed to the 
direction and not to an ‘absolute’ result. In the past, they had “...directly a positive sign, now 
if this positive sign was plus ten, plus twelve, plus nine, plus seventeen, it did mean 
something but not something tragic” (HD B). Before, this “...was not evaluated that much... 
now there is no room for that, you have to set up the budget in such a way that, at the end, the 
result is the one that should be” (HD C).  
 “The point is that the budgets have a target now, have a real target, which must be 
achieved, because the cost category of third parties’ debts, interests, and so on, has 
gone up enormously, enormously. Unfortunately that is a factor that cannot change. 
All other budget elements but that one can change, and that gives you the direction 
now on how you are about to act and what result you are going to have” (HD B). 
 
The change, from direction planning to setting targets, was recognised by the agents in the 
hotel level as a change in their priorities. The same director that reported that budgeting could 
not now be used for negotiating resource allocations reflected that that there was “...an 
enormous change in the way you think when submitting a budget”, i.e. change in the 
priorities of the agents’ conduct, which follows now a rather pragmatic approach:   
  
“...your revenue is given, that is the revenue might go down, it cannot go up... and you 
also take the standard costs from the accounts department, those [costs] that are not 
dependent on your administration as a hotel director, then you try to figure out how to 
shape the costs that are up to you, in order for the final result to come about, this is 
where the game is right now” (HD B).  
 
While these changes were about budget preparation, there were also a number of significant 
changes regarding the use of the budget during the operational year. The challenge now was 
to actually meet the budgeted targets, rather than to see the targets as indicators. Variances 
were always monitored, but after the crisis variance control became tighter and more 
stringent. As mentioned, expenditure “...was specifically set” (HRD), even before the second 
phase of changes, as a result of the effort to control cash flow. Setting specific monthly 
targets to the budgets, in terms of revenue and cost, was insufficient by itself to achieve the 
targets. They were aware that: 
 
“...because the tourist product is a sensitive one, during the period something may 
happen... and as a result the budgeted revenue cannot really come... this can affect 
largely the parts of cost too, but this is something that you cannot foresee. What you 
can do though, if it becomes obvious that this will happen, is to submit an 
extraordinary budget revision” (HD D).  
 
The directives and expectations that were put forward in the second phase turned the budget 
into a ‘wall’. In order to cross the budgeted ‘limits’, a director now needed to submit a 
revision, justify the need and get formal approval. While the dispositions of formality were 
challenged in the case of quality control, they were drawn upon and co-mediated the course 
of action in the modifications introduced in budgeting. Quite importantly the directors were 
now expected to act and get approval in advance: “...if something goes over the limit they 
must justify it, even if it is something that they didn’t expect, but it would be better and more 
harmless to inform before they cross the limit” (EHsk). There is now an expectation of pro-
activeness, about “monitoring the budget… not enough just to monitor it” (HD C). In other 
words, there came to be an expectation of active budget orientation and aggressive budget 
engagement:  
 “It doesn’t matter which month we refer to, what matters is that in order to monitor 
the budget of July, I have to start two months in advance... because when we are in 
July the month is over, what is to be done has been done, you cannot do much” (HD 
A). 
 
While in the first phase senior management addressed critically the figurational dimension of 
budgeting, in this second phase they distanced themselves from the normative dimension too, 
and strategically tried to modify both. However, in order to act they also drew upon their 
formal dispositions in an unreflective way. The latter significantly co-mediated the course of 
action and the budgeting structures became more bureaucratic and formal than before. 
Introducing greater degrees of formality was not the only possible direction that could be 
followed. The crisis could trigger change towards more flexible controls, or even to the 
abandonment of budgeting (Becker, 2014). While critical distancing directs to the visible 
motivations of strategic action, and to the structural characteristics that the agent(s)-in-focus 
may wish to modify or preserve, what is drawn upon unreflectively also mediates the course 
of action and may be necessary in order to explain the direction of action. In other words, 
both external and internal structures (interactively) co-mediated the course of budgeting 
action, although in varying degrees upon an unreflective to reflective continuum (Mouzelis, 
2008: 115-119).  
 
During the interviews the researchers never had the feeling that the outcome of these changes 
on budgeting was a predetermined design with a master plan. While most of them were 
introduced by senior management, the interventions of hotel directors and their teams also 
had a significant role on the outcome, especially to the spatial expansion of budgeting to 
lower positions. If addressed as a whole, the changes in budgeting may appear revolutionary 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000). However, the changes evolved gradually during a 4 year period 
and were aimed at improving current practices, rather than introducing a one-off radical plan 
of budget reorientation. Perhaps revolutionary change describes better the changes in the 
quality control procedures. The managers wanted to control the costs, they wanted to secure a 
positive cash flow and, during the second phase of changes, they wanted to make sure that the 
organisation would remain profitable, even if only marginally. The ongoing environmental 
turbulence triggered management to try to respond as fast as possible to changes and, when 
possible, to try to be proactive. Not all of the changes were actually new ‘rules’, but rather 
directives or changes of expectations on how to apply the existing norms. Variance control 
was of course there before, but now it is expected to be monitored well in advance. Budget 
revisions were also within their procedures, but before it was “...not like this, it had to be 
something tragic, not like this” (EHsk). Now, it is a common event rather than an 
extraordinary one.  
 
5. Discussion 
The changes set out in the case study resulted in a quite sophisticated use of budget control. 
The senior management pressed for more consistent application of the already existing 
norms, and gradually issued a small number of directives also modifying the normative level 
of budgeting structures. As a result, an interesting re-schematisation at the figurational level 
took place, in which variance control came to be variance management. Budgeting came to 
be “...more substantial” (HRD). Codifying the change, this came to be by (a) the exact setting 
of revenue and spending time to the budget, (b) proactive variance control before any 
calendar month of the operational year, (c) submission of budget revisions in case of 
variances, before or during the month (these revisions were not just for recording the 
variances, but include the specific close-future actions plans for fast variance correction), and 
(d) post-action variance control, which in many cases was to be the start of a new circle 
centring on the next month. Since the actual challenge was “...to respond quickly to whatever 
the future comes to be” (Otley, 2003), budgets gradually became a “locus of institutionalised 
reflexivity” (Seal et al., 2004), constantly monitoring and regulating the action within the 
organisation.  
 
Moreover, the changes expanded budgetary control deeper in organisational space, by 
prescribing budgeting practice as a normative obligation to lower post positions. Although 
the changes in budgeting enhanced the formality of the control structures and intensified 
budgeting practice, there were changes following the opposite direction. Many control 
procedures that were mainly directed at controlling lower operational staff had to be loosened 
and de-bureaucratised in order to release more operational time, to enhance productivity. This 
was particularly intense in regards to quality control. Finally, the examination on the objects 
of change includes questions on those who are changing (Busco et al., 2007). These changes 
reinforced a spreading of an accounting mentality within the organisation, so that there was a 
change on the dispositions (Stones, 2005: 89) of the agents: “...when we say that we are 
becoming accountants, yes, that is truth, we are becoming because we have to monitor [the 
budget] closely, much more closely than before” (HD A).  
 
In regards to the subjects of change, before the crisis the reproduction of budgeting used to be 
the outcome of the interactions between the senior management at the head office in Athens 
and the directors of their hotels dispersed throughout Greece. Many of the modifications on 
budgeting came from the senior level, to control the hotel directors. Yet, the hotel directors 
and their teams were the ones who moved towards more detailed and accurate budgets, in an 
effort to find adequate space for the required actions that would result in savings. Moreover, 
the ‘invitation’ to lower level agents to engage in budgeting was more the result of their 
agency too. Before “...the directors were dealing with the budget... you can now ask 
everyone, the lower supervisor, he has this fear not to get away from it... now the director 
puts everyone in the game, that is, he has rolled his stress over” (EHsk). In the course of 
structuration, norms and rules can emerge not only from above, but also from below 
(Mouzelis, 1992). It seems thus that there were different logics (Burns and Vaivio, 2001), in 
which different clusters of agents played their parts, although unequal in weight, in the 
structural outcome. These were, and are, not the only logics present in the organisation. 
Quality performance is recognised as vital given that the hotels target upper market segments. 
However, the changes in context shifted the capabilities and the priorities of the agents-in-
focus, both empowering logics of accounting control and weakening logics of quality control, 
i.e. they were enabling for the former, but constraining the latter. Agents favouring quality 
logics were, and still are, potential change agents. However, variations in capabilities point 
towards the actual change agents, and add to the understanding of the course of change.  
 
The varying degrees of distancing between an agent-in-focus and the structures that mediate 
her/his actions indicate the local causalities of action. Eliciting knowledge on the local 
causation of actions is one of the main objectives of explanatory qualitative research 
(Huberman and Miles, 1985: 143-148; Sayer, 2000: 114-118; Scapens, 1992; Maxwell, 
2004). The framework adopted here facilitated an exploration of how a contextual change 
driver is translated to endogenous change. The crisis, as a change driver, shifted the horizon 
of action of the agents-in-focus, and triggered awareness and reflection. However, actual 
change came from distinguishable clusters-of-agents within the organisation. They reflected 
upon how the changes in context impacted upon both the organisation and their own projects. 
Moreover, they reflected upon their in-situ control structures and strategically acted to 
modify them. The agents in the case study, set in action by the crisis, started criticising the 
ways they practiced budgeting, drawing upon the ways they should do this according to their 
norms. Questioning and intervention on their norms came gradually in a subsequent phase. In 
other words, there were episodes of distancing themselves from structures. As illustrated in 
the case study, this distancing is always incomplete, as the agents drew upon a plurality of 
structures in order to interpret their organisational control structures through criticism and 
questioning norms.  
 
Organisational agents are not isolated from the broader social environments of action which 
co-mediate their reading of the situation: “It is because, especially nowadays, you have to 
have a result targeted that must come about” (HD B). Nevertheless, it is this partial and 
selective distancing that pushes them to act in certain ways and not otherwise. What is of 
particular importance is that through this distancing we can observe, in parallel, the 
unconscious reproduction of other structural features. Although questioned during the case 
study about their quality control structures, the formalities imbued in the dispositions of staff 
during previous times persisted and co-mediated their budgeting practices, and these were, in 
turn, reproduced by those practices. In short, a contextual change driver, in-situ control 
structures, and internalised dispositions interactively shaped the course of action. Context and 
content analysis is used to analyse the variations in the ways these abstract concepts interact, 
and to indicate local reasoning of action.   
 
The approach taken here provides an alternative to the ways in which ST is usually applied in 
empirical research. Predominantly, ST is used as a sensitising device (Englund et al., 2011) 
for inductive work, and not as a means to design a priori a study with a specific research 
problem at hand. Giddens’ (1984: 373-375) suggests that structuration processes should be 
investigated through the methodological bracketing of institutional analysis, which is 
conducted in the absence of subjectivity, and strategic conduct analysis, which places 
institutions in suspension. In accounting research, this suggestion has lead to just one side of 
the bracket being employed, namely the institutional which becomes the focus of the majority 
of ST studies (Englund et al., 2011).There have been debates on whether the institutional 
(Scapens and Macintosh, 1996) or the strategic approach (Boland, 1993; Englund et al., 
2011) is closer to the original premises of the theory. In comparison, Stones develops the 
missing epistemological aspects of structuration using agent’s conduct and context analysis. 
This may reduce institutional analysis but it provides a balanced approach to the study of 
specificities of change and the duality of structure because it becomes possible to address 
how the external mediates the agents’ conduct, and how action, in turn, reproduces, 
challenges, or modifies structures.    
 
6. Conclusions  
The framework discussed in this paper was developed in order to study ex-post how the 
budgeting and management control practices and structures were adapted after the triggering 
of the financial crisis. The experience gained through this research project shows that SST 
provides a strong methodological pathway in order to address the process of structuration 
from the agents’ point of view. Through interpretations provided by agents-in-focus it is 
possible to address not only their practices, but also the practices of other clusters-of-agents 
and how these affect change.  Moreover, the QNS model directs the analysis of narrative 
data, since it analytically positions in time external, internalised structures, active agency, and 
structural outcomes (Jack and Kholeif, 2007). Researchers are not necessarily addressing 
every phenomenon that co-evolve in practice (Czarniawska, 2014) but designing research 
with this theory in mind (Layder, 1999) allows us to examine the nuances and fine brush 
strokes (Stones, 2005) of specific phenomena. A theoretically informed research design has 
the advantage of engaging directly with the phenomenon under study and the sequence of 
events associated with it. However, if rigidly applied it may restrict researchers from 
acknowledging other co-evolving phenomena linked to the problem at hand, like the interplay 
of budgeting and quality controls in the case of this project. One further limitation is that by 
using prior theory one limits the findings of any research to the range of the pre-defined 
concepts. The design of this research is directed towards collecting specific data, therefore 
other data that may not be collected limit the scope of this study. However, the use of the 
interview method offers many opportunities to identify not previously envisaged data and 
phenomena, so it lessens these limitations. 
 
It has to be mentioned that the dichotomy between independent and irresistible external 
structures does not adequately describe the control structures of organisations. Control 
structures here are treated as irresistible, but in respect that certain powerful agents can 
modify them. The work of Mouzelis was very helpful in the course of this research. Although 
Stones implements many of Mouzelis’ suggestions in the QNS model, there is space for a 
closer interconnection. Mouzelis’ (1989; 2000; 2008) approach on a dual conception (i.e. 
institutional and relational) of external structures, and the variability of the relations between 
structures and agents, as well as on the power capabilities of agents complement in many 
ways the QNS and provide interesting questions for future research.   
 
It is suggested that the framework can provide a basis for retrospective case studies on 
management accounting change. Researchers following that approach are advised to apply 
the model in an ongoing sequence. As the case illustrates, there may be phases in change 
efforts, which may have differing results on in-situ structures. On the one hand, in this 
research it was possible to address how institutionalised control practices changed, by whom, 
and why they changed towards certain directions and not others. On the other hand, a 
different research design is needed in order to address whether these changes become 
institutionalised in turn.  Although many suggestions from the data may support such a claim, 
periodic research visits like the ones made by Coad and Herbert (2009) are maybe better 
designed to address such a question. Moreover, the framework may have to be modified in 
order to analyse practice following other drivers of change, or change triggered by other 
events. Future research following that line should pay attention to the co-mediating role of 
dispositions for shaping the course of change. Another point that may bring interesting 
insights is the intentional change/unintentional reproduction mix that strategic action may 
bring about. Finally, more research is needed in order to test whether this framework can 
assist research following different designs, such as in-depth or longitudinal studies.  
  
Notes 
1. The degree of influence on structural modification that the agent(s)-in-focus have 
depends on their (a) perceived power to resist, (b) their knowledge of alternative 
courses of action, and (c) the critical distancing that is needed in order to engage in 
strategic stance in relation to a particular external structure (Stones, 2005, 114-115). 
2. HRD = Human Resources Director. 
FD = Financial Director. 
HD A, HD B, HD C, HD D = Hotel Directors. 
SE = Senior Executive. 
EHsk = Executive Housekeeper. 
3. The term ‘update’, rather than ‘revision’, is used because it is a routine procedure and, 
moreover, takes place before the operational period commences. 
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